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Precertification Settlement of Class Actions.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, before a
class action in the federal courts can proceed to trial on the merits, the suit
must be certified as a class action.' Once certification has been ordered,
dismissals and compromises of the action are subject to Rule 23(e), 2 which
requires court approval of the proposed settlement or dismissal and notice
of the termination to absent class members.3 Rule 23(e)'s provision for
court approval and notice protects the interests of absent class members'
by providing the absentees with an opportunity to object to the fairness
and adequacy of the settlement., Where a precertification settlement is
reached, however, notice to the putative class is not as crucial since the
August 8, 1978). The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the
court's application of state law was proper. Butner v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 914, 917.
However, the Court did not address the petitioner's challenge to the application of North
Carolina law by the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 916.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides that "[als soon as practicable after the commence-
ment of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is
to be so maintained." Certification involves a qetermination by the district court that the
purported class exists in fact and not merely on the basis of the allegations in the plaintiff's
complaint. See generally 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 1100-1160 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as NEWsER]; Connolly & Connolly, Qualifying Title WI Class Action Discrimination Suits:
A Defendant's Perspective, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 181, 182-83 (1977).
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) states that "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compro-
mised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
3 Although Rule 23(e) seemingly applies to all dismissals, courts have held that no notice
must be sent to absent class members when the dismissal is based on the merits of the class
claim, when the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or when
a defendant who is not an indispensible party is dismissed. See Washington v. Wyman, 54
F.R.D. 266, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Daugherty v. Ball, 43 F.R.D. 329, 335 (C.D. Cal. 1967);
Smith v. Industrial Sec. Corp., 49 F. Supp. 959, 960 (D. Conn. 1943); Massaro v. Fisk Rubber
Corp., 36 F. Supp. 382, 386 (D. Mass. 1941).
4 See McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 556 F.2d 298, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1977); Berse v.
Berman, 60 F.R.D. 414, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Washington'v. Wyman, 54 F.R.D. 266, 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The purpose of Rule 23(e) notice is to inform the members of the class of the terms
and options open to them under the proposed settlement. 2 NEWBERG, supra note 1, at §
2650(a); see Miller v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1977); Grunin
v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 122 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864
(1975); Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 455
F.2d 101, 108 (7th Cir. 1972); Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom., Act Heating & Plumb-
ing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971).
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putative class is not bound by the named plaintiffs settlement.6 But if a
valid class does exist,' the elimination of the named plaintiff prior to cer-
tification may prejudice the putative class which relied on the plaintiff,
as class representative, to champion class claimsA In Shelton v. Pargo,
Inc.,' the Fourth Circuit considered whether Rule 23(e) should be ex-
tended to precertification settlements and rejected a strict application
of Rule 23(e) in favor of a more flexible approach employing the policy
considerations inherent in Rules 23(e) and (d).10
Shelton filed a complaint "on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated" alleging that her employer, Pargo, had engaged in racially dis-
criminatory employment practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.11 Pargo's answer included a motion to strike all allega-
tions of a class action.'2 In response to Pargo's answer, Shelton moved the
district court to certify the class action and to allow the suit to proceed as
both an individual action and a class action under Rule 23.1' While these
motions were pending, Shelton and Pargo settled the claim." Shortly
I A voluntary stipulation of dismissal signed by all the parties appearing in the action
operates as an adjudication upon the merits of the plaintiffs claim, thus foreclosing the
named plaintiffs right to sue on the dismissed claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). Nevertheless,
a voluntary dismissal of the named plaintiff's claim under Rule 41(a)(1) does not moot the
class claim unless the settlement agreement purports to settle the class claim as well. 3
NEwBERG, supra note 1, at § 4960. Therefore, the court is not foreclosed from inquiring into
any possible prejudice caused by dismissal of the putative class claim. See, e.g., Laurenzano
v. Texaco, Inc., 14 FED. RuLES SERV. 2d 1262, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Prior to certification, see note 1 supra, the district court can usually garner some
indication on the validity of the class by the number of motions to intervene in the action or
the strength of the plaintiffs precertification discovery information on class viability. Phila-
delphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
1 See Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549-50 (1949); Young v. Higbee Co.,
324 U.S. 204, 213 (1945); Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. 1li. 1970); Miller v.
Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Prejudice to the absent class occurs when
a settlement and dismissal binds the absent class members by operating as res judicata
against the class claim. See generally Dole, The Settlement of Class Actions for Damages,
71 COLUM. L. Rav. 971 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Dole]; McGough & Lerach, Termination
of Class Actions: The Judicial Role, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 445 (1972). Prejudice to the absent
class also may result when the named plaintiff and defendant reach a collusive settlement
which purports to settle the class claim and the absent class is given no opportunity to object
to the terms of the settlement. Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. at 483; see Develop-
ments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 1318, 1540-41 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Developments- Class Actions].
582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978).
10 Id. at 1302-16. In cases covered by Rule 23, the court may make a wide variety of
administrative orders, including notice of any change in the action, to protect the absent class
and efficiently conduct the handling of the class action. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
" 582 F.2d at 1300; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et. seq. (1976).
,2 582 F.2d at 1300.
' Id. at 1300-01. A plaintiff is entitled to maintain both an individual and a class action
in one suit. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A); Jordan v. Wolke, 75 F.R.D. 696, 698-99 (E.D.
Wis. 1977). A plaintiff may desire to maintain both an individual and a class action when
one of the plaintiff's particular issues is not common to the class. Jordan v. Wolke, 75 F.R.D.
at 698.
" 582 F.2d at 1301.
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thereafter, the district court denied Pargo's motion to strike the class alle-
gations and ruled that Shelton's motion to certify the class was prema-
ture."5 The parties then attempted to have the action dismissed under Rule
41(a)(1),'1 but the district court would not allow the dismissal until the
parties sent a court-approved notice to the putative class members.'7 The
district court reasoned that, although the putative class would not be
bound by the settlement, Rule 23(e) always requires that members of a
putative class receive notice even though the class has not been certified.'8
The district court stated that the putative class may have relied on the
named plaintiff to prosecute its claim, and was therefore entitled to notice
so the class could take action to protect its own rights.'9
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Pargo argued that Rule 23(e)'s notice
requirement only applies to actions certified as class actions and, since the
class had never been certified, the settlement involved no more than the
dismissal of an individual action."0 Pargo also contended that since the
district court found that a dismissal of Shelton's action would not bind the
putative class members,2' such settlements should be encouraged and not
inhibited by a notice requirement.2 Additionally, Pargo criticized the dis-
trict court for not refraining from ordering notice of the proposed settle-
ment until and unless the action was certified under Rule 23(c)(1).2
The Fourth Circuit held that the necessity of notice of a precertification
settlement must be determined from the facts of the particular case.
24
While not requiring the district court to undertake a certification hearing
in every case,n the Fourth Circuit held that a district court must conduct
a careful hearing into the terms of a precertification settlement to deter-
mine whether dismissal of the suit would result in prejudice to the puta-
tive class or whether the named plaintiff used the class action device for
unfair personal gain in negotiating the settlement.28 If the district court
is satisfied from the hearing that no prejudice to the putative class will
result and that the plaintiff has not used the class action device to increase
'5 /d.
"Id.; see note 6 supra.
,7 582 F.2d at 1301. The notice in Shelton was designed to inform putative class members
of the settlement and dismissal of the named plaintiff's claim and to give the putative class
members an opportunity to intervene in the action. Id.
,1 Id. The district court relied on the reasoning in Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D.
396 (N.D. Ohio 1973), applying a procedural rule first enunciated in Philadelphia Elec. Co.
v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967). In Philadelphia Electric, the
district court applied the Rule 23(e) notice and settlement approval provisions to precertifica-
tion settlements. Id. at 327; see text accompanying notes 47-56 infra.
" 582 F.2d at 1301; see text accompanying note 8 supra.
2 Id. at 1302.
21 Id.; see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974); Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 759-62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
21 582 F.2d at 1302.
SId.
2 Id. at 1315.
n Id. at 1314-15.
Id. at 1314-16.
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unfairly the size of his settlement, the district court may approve the
settlement and dismissal without engaging in a Rule 23(c) (1) certification
hearing or requiring Rule 23(e) notice to be given to the putative class.2
The district court can, however, order a certification hearing or notice even
in the absence of prejudice to the putative class or misuse of the class
action procedure by the named plaintiff."
In deciding not to require notice of a precertification settlement in
every case, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the explicit language of Rule
23(e) only applies to the dismissal or compromise of a "class action." 9 The
court noted that a suit is not properly a class action until certification is
accomplished under Rule 23(c)(1).11 Before certification, unnamed puta-
tive class members are not bound by any settlement reached by the named
plaintiff.3' The court realized that Rule 23(e)'s purpose is to prevent un-
named members of a certified class from being bound by a settlement of
their claims by the named plaintiff without an opportunity to object to the
settlement terms.2 Since putative class members are not bound by a pre-
certification settlement of the named plaintiffs action, the court reasoned
that Rule 23(e) notice to the putative class is unnecessary.3 Thus, the
2 Id. The Rule 23(e) notice provision is not automatically applied to precertification
settlements, since the Fourth Circuit determined that the notice provision does not apply
until the class is certified under Rule 23(c)(1). See text accompanying notes 29-34 infra.
11 582 F.2d at 1314-16. If the fair conduct of the action so requires, the district court may
order notice or a certification hearing under Rule 23(c)(1). Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
21 Id. at 1303; see Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States District Court, 523 F.2d
1073, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1975); Weight Watchers of Phila., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, 455
F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 70 F.R.D. 639, 642 (W.D.
Pa. 1976).
31 582 F.2d at 1302; see East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 398 (1977);
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 n.8 (1975); Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, 1348 (4th
Cir. 1976); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States District Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1079
(9th Cir. 1975); Laurenzano v. Texaco, Inc., 14 FED. RULEs SERv. 2d 1262, 1263 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Berger v. Purolator Prods., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The Fourth
Circuit noted two recent cases which questioned the assumption the Rule 23(e) applies only
to certified actions. 582 F.2d at 1303-04; see Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61,
67 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Duncan v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615, 616 (E.D. Wis.
1975) (certification is not a prerequisite to use of Rule 23(e) to control the dismissal of a
precertification settlement). Widely accepted, however, among the courts and commentators
is the assumption that Rule 23(e) comes into operation only after certification. See, e.g.,
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United
States District Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1975); Wheeler, Predismissal Notice
and Statutes of Limitations in Federal Class Actions After American Pipe and Construction
Co. v. Utah, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 771, 775 n.16a (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler]; Com-
ment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class
Representative, 1974 DuKE L.J. 573, 599 [hereinafter cited as Continuation of Class Actions].
31 582 F.2d at 1303; see Nesenoff v. Muten, 67 F.R.D. 500, 503 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1974);
Beaver Assoc. v. Cannon, 59 F.R.D. 508, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Polakoff v. Delaware Steeple-
chase and Race Ass'n, 264 F. Supp. 915, 917 (D. Del. 1966).
'1 582 F.2d at 1303; see text accompanying note 5 supra.
Id. Additionally, the Rule 23(e) requirements of court approval of a settlement and
notice to absent class members presume that a class exists to receive the notice. Without a
Rule 23(c)(1) certification determination to identify the members of the class, the issuance
[Vol. XXXVI
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court determined that Rule 23(e) is not designed, nor should it be used, to
notify unnamed putative class members of a precertification settlement.u
While the Rule 23(e) notice provision is by its terms inapplicable to a
precertification settlement, the Fourth Circuit recognized that plaintiff
abuse of the class action device requires district court control over the
disposition of a suit filed as a class action.s The court reasoned that, due
to the special responsibility imposed on courts by actions brought as class
actions,3 the district court has broad supervisory power under Rule 23(d)
over precertification motions to dismiss." The district court need not con-
duct a certification hearing or send notice to the putative class to exercise
its supervisory role over the uncertified class action., The terms of the
proposed settlement must be subjected to a careful hearing, however, to
determine whether abuse of the class action device has occurred. 9 If the
district court finds no evidence of abuse, the court may approve the settle-
of Rule 23(e) notice is very difficult. Also, absent knowledge of the membership nature of the
class, problems in the form, wording and publication of the notice are encountered. The
foregoing problem suggest that if a district court determines that notice is necessary to protect
a putative class, the court must make at least some minimal inquiry into the existence of a
class and the terms of a precertification settlement. See generally 2 NEWBERG, supra note 1,
at § 2650-70; see also text accompanying notes 35-40 & 44-46 infra.
u 582 F.2d at 1303.
Is Id. at 1306; see Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973);
Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 1972); Chrapliwy
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 461, 464 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
14 Rule 41(a)(1) allows the parties to enter a voluntary dismissal without court approval,
subject to Rule 23(e), which requires court approval of the dismissal of a class action. Despite
the fact that an action is not properly a class action before certification, see text accompany-
ing note 30 supra, class action allegations in a complaint are not viewed by the court as if
they do not exist. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Glen Alden Corp. v. Kahan, 398 U.S. 95 (1970); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713, 715
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Continuation of Class Actions, supra note 30, at 596. Furthermore, there is
a presumption of class action status until certification is denied. See Pearson v. Ecological
Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., Skydell v. Ecological
Science Corp., 425 U.S. 912 (1976); Held v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 64 F.R.D. 346, 347 (S.D.
Tex. 1974). Although Rule 23(e) expressly applies only to certified class actions, an action
filed as a class action will be so considered before certification. Therefore, Rule 41(a)(1)
dismissal without court approval is not available. 582 F.2d at 1306; Greenfield v. Villager
Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.20 (3d Cir. 1973); Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251, 257 (2d
Cir. 1972); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 461, 464 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
31 582 F.2d at 1306; see Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir.
1973); Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1067-68 (E.D. Wis. 1976), affl'd, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); Peoples v. Wainwright, 325 F. Supp. 402, 403 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Levin v. Mississippi
River Corp., 289 F. Supp. 353, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Although the Shelton court cited these
cases, none of them consider the use of Rule 23(d) at the precertification stage. Nevertheless,
several authorities assert that Rule 23(d) gives the district court the power and discretion to
supervise a precertification settlement and dismissal. Bantolina v. Aloha Motors, Inc., 75
F.R.D. 26, 33 (D. Hawaii 1977); Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 499-500 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class Actions at the Precertification Stage: Is Notice Required?,
56 N.C.L. REv. 303, 330-$1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Almond]; Dole, supra note 8, at 985;
Developments-Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1548.
*' 582 F.2d at 1306, 1314; see text accompanying notes 61-66 infra.
3' 582 F.2d at 1314.
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ment and dismiss the action."
The Fourth Circuit realized that plaintiff abuse of the class action
device can occur because the plaintiff, as representative party, voluntarily
accepts a "fiduciary obligation" towards the putative class.' Such an obli-
gation cannot be abandoned by a collusive settlement agreement with the
defendant"2 nor by insertion of a class allegation in the complaint in order
to secure additional bargaining leverage over the defendant during the
precertification stage of the litigation. 3 Since either form of plaintiff abuse
of the class action device can occur at any point once the action is filed as
a class action," the Fourth Circuit relied on the supervisory responsibility
of the district court, as embodied in Rule 23(d), to give the district court
broad administrative power to curb such abuse." Apart from the question
of whether Rule 23(e) can be used to provide judicial control over precerti-
o Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1305. "[Tihe active participants . . . possess, in a very real sense, fiduciary
obligations to those not before the court . . ." Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d
824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973). See also 2 NEWBERG, supra note 1, at § 2705(a). Newberg notes that
some courts have characterized the plaintiff's representative responsibility to the class as
similar to the attorney-client relationship or that of a private attorney general with duties
analogous to the public counterpart. 2 NEWBERG, supra note 1, at § 2705(a) at 1173. Thus,
the named plaintiff's representative role begins at the filing of the complaint and does not
terminate until the appeal process is completed. See Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 549-50 (1949); Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 213 (1945); Sheffield v. Itawamba
County Bd. of Supervisors, 439 F.2d 35, 36 (5th Cir. 1971).
42 582 F.2d at 1307; see text accompanying note 8 supra.
, 582 F.2d at 1305-06. The class allegation gives the named plaintiff certain leverage over
the defendant not available if the suit were brought as an individual action. City of Philadel-
phia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, Transcript of Proceedings, March 1, 1971, p. 11
(D.N.J. 1971) ("I have seen nothing so conducive to the settlement of complex litigation as
the establishment of a class"). If used only to gain additional bargaining leverage, the inclu-
sion of a class claim unfairly forces the defendant to prepare for a class action rather than an
individual claim. See Renfrew, Negotiation and Judicial Scrutiny in Civil and Criminal
Antitrust Cases, 70 F.R.D. 495, 500-01 (1976). Faced with the possibility of complex litigation
as expressed in the class allegtion, the defendant is more likely to attempt to placate the
plaintiff in return for an early dismissal of the action. See, e.g., Simon, Class Actions-Useful
Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 389 (1972).
582 F.2d at 1306.
,5 Id. at 1309. The Fourth Circuit cited Bantolina v. Aloha Motors, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 26,
33 (D. Hawaii 1977) to support its holding that Rule 23(d)(2) gives the district court broad
supervisory power over precertification motions to dismiss the action. In Bantolina, however,
the court had already determined class viability and had certified the class. The named
plaintiff, however, decided to withdraw his motion to certify the class and instead moved that
the entire action be dismissed. Since the action was no longer certified, the Bantolina court
held that although Rule 23(e) could not apply, see text accompanying notes 29-34 supra, Rule
23(d)(2) gave the district court the power to inquire into the dismissal of the named plaintiff
and whether the dismissal would prejudice the rights of the putative class. 75 F.R.D. at 32-
33. The court also found that where a precertification motion to dismiss is before the court,
Rule 23(d) appears applicable regardless of Rule 23(e)'s similar supervisory power. Id. The
Bantolina court concluded by noting that since no reliance by the putative class on the named
plaintiff's representative status could be shown and no prejudice to the putative class was
present, the action could be dismissed with court approval without having to notify the
putative class of the dismissal. Id. at 33; see text accompanying notes 75-79 infra.
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fication settlements and dismissals, the Fourth Circuit thus held that Rule
23(d) gives the district court ample authority to supervise the dispostibn
of class actions at the precertification stage."
The Fourth Circuit recognized, however, an alternative line of preced-
ent which employs the purposes of Rule 23(e)4" as a basis for approval of
precertification settlements." In an effort to reconcile prior interpretations
of Rule 23(e) and to provide further authority for district court supervision
over precertification settlements and dismissals, the Fourth Circuit exam-
ined Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co."
Philadelphia Electric held that during the interim between filing and class
certification, an action brought as a class action must be assumed to be a
class action for the purposes of a dismissal or compromise under Rule
23(e), unless and until a contrary determination is made under Rule
23(c)(1).10 In Philadelphia Electric, the precertification settlement be-
tween the named plaintiff and three of the thirteen defendants purported
to bind not only the named plaintiff but also members of the putative
class." The Philadelphia Electric court noted that Rule 23(e) clearly ap-
plied to the post-certification situation where class members are bound by
a settlement.2" Therefore, where the parties attempt to bind the putative
class by the terms of a precertification settlement, due process considera-
tions may require notice of the settlement even in the absence of Rule 23(e)
bpcause of the binding effect of the settlement.53 Additionally, the district
court stated that before approving a settlement, a court should know
whether the claims of the putative class are being compromised by the
582 F.2d at 1306.
" See text accompanying note 5 supra.
' 582 F.2d at 1307.
42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
" Id. at 327.
5' Id.
52 Id.; see text accompanying note 8 supra.
0 42 F.R.D. at 327. Due process considerations may arise when the putative class will
be bound by a proposed settlement that purports to bar all further claims by the class
represented by the settling plaintiff. Richmond Black Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Rich-
mond, 386 F. Supp. 151, 158 (E.D. Va. 1974); In re Four Seasons Sec. Law Litigation, 63
F.R.D. 422, 429-30 (W.D. Old. 1974), affl'd, 525 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975); Berse v. Berman,
60 F.R.D. 414, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); text accompanying note 8 supra. Also, a denial of due
process of law may occur when the putative class relies on the named plaintiff to prosecute
the action, and the action is dismissed before the putative class has an opportunity to inter-
vene. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. at 3271 Berse v. Berman,
60 F.R.D. at 416; Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43
F.R.D. 39, 40 (1967). The reliance interest of the putative class may be at best speculative
and usually does not arise unless the case receives sufficient pretrial publicity to inform
members of the putative class of the existence of the action. See Wheeler, supra note 30, at
790. See also Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 67-70 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Elias
v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276, 277 (D. Minn. 1973). Therefore, the reliance
interest of the putative class should be given little weight since reliance on the named plain-
tiff's prosecution of the action presupposes that the putative class has knowledge of the
existence of the action. Wheeler, supra note 30, at 804-05.
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settlement.14 The Philadelphia Electric court thus relied on the purposes
inherent in Rule 23(e) to extend to the district court the same control over
precertification settlements as mandated by Rule 23(e) for post-
certification settlements and dismissals.55 Before the district court can
order notice to the putative class, however, the class must be certified
under Rule 23(c) (1).11
In Shelton, however, the Fourth Circuit distinguished the holding of
Philadelphia Electric. The Fourth Circuit noted that the settlement in
Shelton bound only the named plaintiff,57 whereas the settlement in
Philadelphia Electric purported to bind the putative class. 8 Since the
putative class in Shelton was not bound by the settlement, neither the
51 42 F.R.D. at 328. The Philadelphia Electric court also cited the relevant statute of
limitations as a due process reason for the application of Rule 23(e). The action was filed
within three weeks of the limitations bar, and if the settlement purporting to bind the
putative class members had been approved, the running of the statute of limitations would
have prevented any attempt by the putative class to institute its own action. Id. at 326. The
expiration of the limitations period is not a bar to the filing of actions by the putative class
once the named plaintiff has settled. Under American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.
538 (1974), the statute of limitations is tolled when the putative class action is filed and does
not begin to run again until the named plaintiff's case is dismissed. Id. at 549-52.
- 42 F.R.D. at 328. The Philadelphia Electric court recognized that the named plaintiff
often attempts to enhance his bargaining leverage for settlement by inserting a class allega-
tion into the complaint. Id.; see note 43 supra. To thwart the practice of asserting class
allegations to force early settlements, Philadelphia Electric held that all suits filed as class
actions are to be treated as such for the purposes of settlement or dismissal of the named
plaintiff's claim. 42 F.R.D. at 326. Thus, the Philadelphia Electric court was able to extend
the Rule 23(e) provision for court review of settlements and dismissals into the precertifica-
tion context. Also, if the court approval and notice provisions of Rule 23(e) do not apply to
precertification settlements, an undue premium is put on early settlements to avoid Rule
23(e) and collusive settlements, operating to the detriment of the putative class, may be
encouraged. 7A C. W RGHT & A. MuisF, FEDERAL PRACTIE AND PROCEDURE, § 1797 at 237
(1972). Other authorities have contested, however, the idea that Rule 23(e) precertification
notice will somehow curb plaintiff abuse of the class action device. Almond, supra note 37,
at 313-15; Wheeler supra note 30, at 797; Developments-Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1542
n.33. Almond argues that precertification notice of a proposed settlement sent to a putative
class is grossly unfair to the defendant since it portrays him as exceptionally willing to settle
early. Therefore, the precertification notice requirement gives the plaintiff a powerful tool to
force settlement of the case before it is filed so the defendant may avoid the precertification
notice requirement. Almond, supra note 37, at 313-14. Those cases which automatically
require notice in precertification settlements, however, ignore the portion of the Philadelphia
Electric holding that notice cannot be sent to the putative class until the class is certified.
Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615, 616-17 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Rotzenburg
v. Neenah Joint School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 181, 182 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Rothman v. Gould, 52
F.R.D. 494, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 482-83 (N.D.
Ill. 1970); see text accompanying notes 56-73 infra.
" 42 F.R.D. at 328. See also Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied sub nom. Glen Alden Corp. v. Kahan, 398 U.S. 95 (1971); Held v. Missouri Pacific
R.R., 64 F.R.D. 346, 351 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D. 396, 399
(N.D. Ohio 1973); Beaver Assoc. v. Cannon, 59 F.R.D. 508, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Berger v.
Purolator Prods., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 3 NEWBERG, supra note 1, at §
4920.
582 F.2d at 1314-15.
42 F.R.D. at 327; see text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
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purposes of Rule 23(e) nor due process would be violated by not sending
notice to the putative class. 9 But where notice is needed to protect the,
putative class,"0 the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Philadelphia Electric
procedure of holding notice in abeyance until certification is too inflexible
for proper judicial control of the class action." An automatic application
of such a procedure would channel every suit filed as a class action into a
certification hearing."2 Thus, a district court would be compelled to order
a certification hearing in every case, 3 even where the prime motivation for
an early settlement is the avoidance of the expense and time involved in
discovery prior to the certification hearing."' The Fourth Circuit held, how-
ever, that absent due process considerations5 or prejudice to putative class
members, the necessity for a certification hearing as a condition to either
notice or approval of a voluntary settlement becomes a matter of discretion
for the district court.6
The Fourth Circuit noted that even the Philadelphia Electric decision
does not compel a certification hearing in every case. Subsequent decisions
have interpreted Philadelphia Electric to require either a blanket precerti-
fication notice requirement 7 a certification hearing before notice is or-
dered,6 or dismissal of the action because Rule 23(e) does not apply. 9 The
5, 582 F.2d at 1314-15; see text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
62 582 F.2d at 1309; see text accompanying note 56 supra.
£2 Id. Certification hearings are notoriously time-consuming and expensive for both the
parties and the courts. Not only is the court required to supervise the precertification discov-
ery devices, but both the plaintiff and the defendant must gather large amounts of informa-
tion either the defeat or support the class allegation. See Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp.,
529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976); Almond, supra note 37, at 326-27; Wheeler, supra note 30,
at 797.
a 582 F.2d at 1311; Wheeler, supra note 30, at 788. Under Philadelphia Electric, a
certification hearing would be needed in every case where prejudice to the putative class
reliance or abuse of the class action device is shown, in order to give the district court the
authority to send notice to the putative class. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass
Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
" 582 F.2d at 1311.
See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
" 582 F.2d at 1309, 1314. Rule 23(e)'s provision for court approval of a settlement gives
the court control over the action to avoid prejudice to the absent class. The rule also prevents
misuse of the class action device by the named plaintiff. See text accompanying notes 5-8 &
41-46 supra. Rule 23(d)'s language allowing court orders for the "fair conduct of the action"
encompasses a judicial administrative power over the continuance of class actions, checked
only by abuse of discretion. See text accompanying notes 37 & 45 supra.
7 See McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 556 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1977); Duncan v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 F.R.D. 615, 616 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Rotzenburg v. Neenah
Joint School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 181, 182 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494,
495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
" See Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 79 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Held v.
Missouri Pacific R.R., 64 F.R.D. 346, 351 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61
F.R.D. 396, 399 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Elias v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276, 277
(D. Minn. 1973).
" See text accompanying note 29 supra. The cases which have rejected Rule 23(e) as a
basis for court control over the dismissal of precertification settlements have not involved
19791
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Fourth Circuit rejected these three alternatives, however, and stated that
where no due process considerations are raised by the terms and circum-
stances of the proposed settlement, Philadelphia Electric's extension of the
Rule 23(e) court approval provision 71 provides support for the same type
of precertification hearing concerning the terms of the settlement as fash-
ioned in Shelton.71 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit stated that the power to
hold a precertification hearing prior to approval of a settlement can be
drawn either from the supervisory power embodied in Rule 23(d) or the
policy of Rule 23(e) to protect absent class members. 2 Under neither
source, however, does the class need to be certified to invoke the power
necessary to conduct the settlement hearing.
73
In Shelton, the Fourth Circuit combined the varying interpretations of
Philadelphia Electric74 to fashion a procedure which strikes a balance be-
tween justified interests of the putative class and the problem of inade-
quate court control over the putative class action. Under the authority of
either Rule 23(d) or (e) the district court must conduct a careful hearing
in which class action abuse and putative class reliance 75 can be weighed
against the policy of encouraging settlements. By not requiring a certifica-
tion hearing before settlement approval, the Fourth Circuit avoids impos-
ing the expense and time of a certification hearing on the settling parties.76
An inquiry to determine whether the named plaintiff has abused the
class action device or whether the putative class has relied on the named
plaintiff to prosecute its claim will not disrupt the settlement unless posi-
tive proof of reliance or abuse is shown. 7  Depending on the circumstances
of the case, the district court may order a certification hearing or Rule 23(e)
notice to the putative class if abuse, reliance or binding effect on the
putative class is shown.78 If the district court finds no evidence of reliance
proof of abuse of the class action device or settlements which would prejudice the rights of
absent class members. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States District Court, 523
F.2d 1073, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1975) (district court desired to notify potential plaintiffs of
pending action in which they could join; no compromise or dismissal motions before the
court); Weight Watchers of Phila., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l., 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir.
1973) (precertification settlements between defendant and potential members of class not
subject to court approval); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 70 F.R.D. 639, 642 (W.D.
Pa. 1976) (direct settlements with individual class members having no effect on the rights of
the class; tender of back pay to individual class members who were free to accept or reject
without affecting class claim).
70 582 F.2d at 1309; see text accompanying note 55 supra.
" 582 F.2d at 1309; see text accompanying notes 35-46 supra.
72 582 F.2d at 1314. See text accompanying notes 45-46 & 54-46 supra.
' 582 F.2d at 1306, 1314.
' See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
7 See text accompanying notes 8 & 41-44 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
7' 582 F.2d at 1316; see Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176-78 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nor., Skydell v. Ecological Science Corp., 425 U.S. 912 (1976);
Elias v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276, 277 (D. Minn. 1973); Almond, supra
note 37, at 332.
70 See text accompanying notes 45-46 & 54-56 supra.
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